





Mintzburg's managerial working role model is used to explore the ways roles
and behavior ofthe general manager ofa user-oriented firm differ from those of
the manager of an investor-owned firm (lOF). It is argued that. in the roles of
conflictresolution.resourceallocation, informationspokesperson,andleadership,
the challenges ofa user-oriented manager are not only signifipantly different but
often more difficult.
Itis concludedthatmanagerscomfortablewith compleXity; technical-operation,
people-oriented resource allocation; multi-stakeholder communication; and with
strongcoalition-buildingskillsaremostsuccessfulinuser-orientedorganizations.
The role of management behavior in the economic performance of
agricultural cooperativeshas received limitedattentionfrom management
science, organizational behavior, and economics research scholars. This
is consistentwith the premise ofmanyearly cooperativewriters who con-
cludedtherewaslittleornoroleof/formanagementincooperatives(Aizsil-
nieks 1952, Aresvik 1955, Clark 1952, Emelianoff 1948, Phillips 1953,I
Robotka 1957). These authors stated cooperative decision making ema-
nated solely from member firms. Helmberger-Hoos (1962), Savage (1954),
and Trifon (1961) counter this behaviorally naive assumption by arguing
cooperative management behavior does affect the economic performance
oftheirorganizationand the performance oftheirpatron-members' firms.
Their arguments, however, were couched in narrowly defined and tightly
constrained single-firm optimizationmodels. More recent research onthe
role of management in the theory of the firm supports the work of this
second group ofwriters (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Fama 1980, Jensen
and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983, Arrow 1951, Williamson
1964, Staatz 1987, Cotterill 1987). These authors suggest thatmanagers
act as agents of principals and attempt to optimize the value of their
pecuniaryandnonpecuniaryrewards.Themanagementbehaviorsimplied
by agent utility maximization allowfor differences with the profit maximi-
zation or per-unit price optimization objectives ofIOFs and cooperatives.
Unfortunately, empirical results in most areas of cooperative manage-
ment behavioral hypotheses are limited or nonexistent. Although this
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paper is not an empirical study of cooperative management behavior, it
is a single observation about the degree ofdifficulty in managing a user-
oriented organization. Several authors have suggested that managing a
user-orientedorganizationsuchasanagriculturalcooperativeisdifferent,
ifnot more difficult, than managingan IOF (Axworthy 1990, LeVay 1983,
Murray 1983, Perrault 1983, Shaffer 1982, Staatz 1987).
The objective ofthis paper is to expand on these authors' thoughts by
exploring organizational differences between investor- and user-oriented
firms. It is argued that organizational differences influence management
behaviorby affectingmanagerial working roles. Recognizing these behav-
ioral influences, though they may be subtle, on managerial roles might
often be difficult but is important to prepare an individual to participate
in cooperative management.
The following comments emanate from the author's experiences while
serving in numerous management and director positions with IOFs and
cooperativeandnonprofitorganizations.Theauthorsharestheseobserva-
tionswiththe hope theywill generate thoughtanddiscussionby coopera-
tive practitioners and thinkers in their attempts to better understand the
performance ofuser-oriented organizations.
Background
Numerous authors have introduced general theories of management
(Fayo11949, Koontz 1964, Frederick 1963, Odiorne 1966).The first phase
ofeachnewtheoryusuallyincludesanexaminationofthenatureofmana-
gerialwork. Fayol (1949), Carroll and Gillen (1987), and Mintzberg (1971)
each introduce different but complementary approaches. For this paper,
Mintzberg's managerial role categorization is used because of its detail
and intuitive appeal.
ManagerialRoles.Mintzberg(1971) describesmanagerialworkinterms
ofthreegeneral categories: (1) activities concerned primarilywith interper-
sonalrelationships (figurehead, liaison, andleadershiproles); (2) activities
dealing with the transfer of inJonnation (monitoring, disseminating, and
spokespersonroles); and (3) activitiesessentiallyinvolving decisionmaking
(entrepreneur, disturbance handler, negotiator, and resource allocator
roles). Managerialroleisdefinedasanorganizedsetofbehaviorsbelonging
to an identifiable office or position (Sarbin and Allen 1968, Mintzberg
1971). Consequently, thethreeinterpersonalroles derive from themanag-
er's2 formal status and authority giving rise to the three informational
rolesthat, inturn, enablethemanagertoperformthefourdecisionalroles.
Interpersonal Roles ofManagement. In thejigureheadrole, the man-
ageris seenasanauthority symbolcarryingoutsocial, legal, and ceremo-
nial duties on behalfofthe organization. In the liaison role, the manager,
byvirtue ofauthority and associated status, develops external horizontal
relationshipsinwhichinformationistradedformutualbenefit. Leadership
involves interpersonal relationships between the leader and the led. In
this role, the manageris responsible for staffing, training, motivating, and
activating subordinates. These interpersonal roles facilitate acquisitionof




seeks and receives information from internal and external sources. The
managerthenprocessesthisinformationintopositiveandnormativecate-
gories preparingit for selective dissemination. Inthe informational roleas
disseminator, the manager disperses externally and internally generated
information to subordinates and peers. In the role of spokesperson, the
manager communicates information internally to the strategic core
(including the board of directors) and externally to other stakeholders
(suppliers, creditors, trade associations, government, the media, cus-
tomers).
Decisional Role ofManagement. The manager's interpersonal activi-
ties give him/herunique access to information. Possessing authorityand
unique informationplacesthe managerinthe key strategicdecision mak-
ing position. In Mintzberg's categorizationprocess thefour decision-mak-
ing roles include entrepreneur, disturbance handler, negotiator, and
resource allocator, described as follows:
• Entrepreneur-In this role, the manager initiates and designs much
ofthe controlled changewithin the organization. Entrepreneurialism
allows for proactive approaches to improving organizational perfor-
mance.
• Disturbance handler-In this role, the manager becomes a reactor to




• Resourceallocator-Aschiefresource allocator, the manageroversees
the allocation of capital, human, and reputation resources. This is
played out in strategic planning processes that ultimately result in:
(1) capitalbudgets, (2) operatingbudgets, (3) human capitalbudgets,
and (4) ad hoc allocations. By maintaining control over resource allo-
cation, themanagercanintegrateand interrelateinformationandthe
dynamics of decision implementation. Therefore the manager
becomesnot onlythe chiefplanner, but also is ultimatelyresponsible
for executing the strategic plan. Allocating resources is simplified
when operating with a coordinated organizational purpose and mis-
sion. The mission evolves from the manager's role as leader, monitor,
spokesperson, and agent ofthe board ofdirectors.
Cooperatives.The twomostfrequentlycitedeconomicjustificationsfor
forming cooperatives dUring the evolution ofU.S. cooperative legislation,
were: (1) individual producers needed an institutional mechanism by
which they could bring economic balance under their control, and (2)
individual farmers needed countervailing power when confronted with
monopsonistic and/or monopolistic market structure.
These economic concerns were addressed legislatively through the
eighty-five state cooperative incorporation laws, the Sherman Antitrust
Act, theClaytonAct, andtheCapper-VolsteadAct. Simultaneously, opera-Management ofCooperatives/Cook 45
ting rules developed beyond the conceptual stage. Subjectto U.S. legisla-
tive constraints, organizationalandoperatingrules evolved from theprin-
ciples and practices developed by the Rochdale Society members during
themid-1800sinEngland. Bythe 1920stheseruleshadbeenconsolidated
into three hard-core principles ofdemocratic control, service at cost, and
limited return on equity (Suhler and Cook 1993).
Theseprinciples have been consistentlyreexamined and modified since
the 1920s, withthe mostrecentredefinition occurringinthe U.S. Senate-
requested study coordinated by the U.S. Department ofAgriculture's
AgriculturalCooperativeService(USDA-ACS) in 1987.Thedefinitionema-
nating from that effort emphasizes the importance of cooperatives being
user-oriented: "A cooperative is a user-owned and controlled business
from which benefits are derived and distributed equitably on the basis of
use" (USDA-ACS 1987, 12). More explicitly:
1. Thefarmer stakeholderownersare tobethemajor usersofthe coop-
erative;
2. The benefits received by the farmer owner who contributed equity
capital to a cooperative are to be tied to the concept of use of the
cooperative in the form ofpatronage; and
3. The control of the cooperative by the farmer owner user must be
structured democraticallyin thatvoting poweris not proportionalto
equity investment although it may be, in certain situations, struc-
tured in proportion to usage.
Theselegislativeandhistoricallydeveloped operatingruleshavemolded
cooperativesinto"tiedequity"firmsinwhichresidualclaimsontheassoci-
ation's income stream are tied, not to the member-investor capital, but
to the user-member patronage. This most distinguishing and essential
property right distribution ofownership and control to patronage rather
than investment has considerable influence on a cooperative's structure
and performance. Staatz (1987), Condon (1987), and Caves and Peterson
(1986) argue that this unique allocation ofrights to residual claims has a
more discernible effectontheincentivesfacedbymanagersofagricultural
cooperativescomparedto theincentivesfacedbymanagers ofIOFs. These
authors hypothesize property right differences between cooperatives and
IOFsinfluenceincentives particularlywhenmanagersconfrontthefollow-
ingissues: objectivefunctionoptimization, equitycapitalacquisition, port-
folio risk distribution, information flows, patron commitment, horizon
problems, andthe transactioncostsofcontrol. These differencesinincen-
tives may, in turn, lead to differences in how managers perform their
interpersonal, informational, and decisional roles. In the next section,
Mintzberg's (1971) "managerial working roles" approach is employed to
explorethesehypotheses regardingdifferencesinthebehaviorofcoopera-
tive and IOF managers.
Decisional Role Differences
This author argues property-right induced differences in managerial
behavior and incentives between cooperatives and IOFs have their most
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infonnational roles is also important, but less so than on the decisional
roles. Their effect on interpersonal roles is the least discernible.
Decisional Role Differences. The decision roles of entrepreneurship,
conflictresolution(disturbancehandler),negotiation, andresourcealloca-
tionform thecoreofthestrategy-makingprocess. Itisinthismanagement
process of making, interrelating, and implementing decisions that the
direction and ultimate success of the organization is determined. Deci-
sions, accordingtoMintzberg(1971), rangealonga continuumfromvolun-
tary-proactive (entrepreneurship) to the involuntary-reactive (conflict res-
olution), with negotiation and resource allocation in between these two
extremes.
EntrepreneurialDifferences. Mintzberg (1971) employs a more limited
definition of entrepreneurship than does the economics profession. He
limits the definition ofentrepreneurship to initiating and designing con-
trolled change within the organization. This role encompasses scanning,
initiating improvement projects (sets ofmini-decisions that move or dis-
continue the exploration ofnew ideas), and acquiring resources to imple-
ment controlled change. Numerous authors have implied that the entre-
preneurial role for a cooperative manager is more limited than for an IOF
manager because cooperatives (1) have limited access to equity capital,
(2) experience the horizon problem (situation where an owner's claim on
the net cashflow generated byan assetis shorterthan the productive life
of the asset), (3) need to engage in building costly consensus-seeking
coalitions in order to initiate change, and (4) are strategically defensive
in nature (a la Nourse's [1922] correction-of-market-failurejcompetitive-
yardstick strategy). These points lay the groundwork for a conservative,
defensive, operation-oriented corporate culture, one that is almost anti-
offensive. Yet many second and third generation Nourse I and Nourse II,
Saprio II, post-1987 FarmCredit, and NewGeneration cooperatives (Cook
1993) have been aggressively innovative and expansion oriented. This
more offensive attitude might be explained byany ofthe following:
1. Relativelylowercosts (lowerscanningcostsbecause ofrelativelybet-
teraccess to more and higher qualityinformationfrom the member),
2. More creative management,
3. A start-up threshold with a lower expected return because of user
demand,
4. Increased threat to financial SUrvivability, or
5. Because of a change in the organization's objective function (mem-
bers developing a set of more investor-oriented expectations from
theircooperativecomparedto morecomplex, broader-in-scope, user-
driven objectives).
In this author's opinion, it is a combination ofthese factors (varying to
some degree for each cooperative), which has led to this recent, more
aggreSSive entrepreneurialthrustbycooperativemanagementandboards
of directors. Cooperatives that have not addressed the naturally anti-
entrepreneurial horizon problem (through more proportional capital
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qualityand more focused communicationwith members appear to be less
open to entrepreneurial management behavior.
Conflict Resolution Differences. In the role ofdisturbance or conflict
handler, the manager takes charge when the organization is threatened.
At any single moment managing conflict takes precedence over involve-
ment with any ofthe other managerial roles.
Ingeneral, therearethreetypesofdisturbances: (1) thelossofresources
or the threat thereof (catastrophic human or physical disaster, loss of a
major customer), (2) conflict between organizations (price wars, sudden
changesina governmentregulation), and (3) conflictbetweenstakeholders
(employee strikes, a boardcoup, a forced exit).The conflictbetweenstake-
holdersoccursbecauseof(1) an overlapinresponsibilities, (2) personality
conflicts, and (3) allocation ofresources.
Cooperative managers face a unique set of conflicts. These emanate
primarily from conflicts over resource allocation among major stakehold-
ers, rooted in vaguely defined and poorly communicated property right
differences. These conflictsare aggregatedintothree cooperativeprinciple
relatedcategories: (1) potentialconflictsamongmembersaboutownership
rights and responsibilities; (2) potential conflicts among members, board,
and management regarding control issues and distribution of decision-
makingauthority; and (3) potentialconflicts among members, board, and
management about benefits derived from cooperative membership. The
ownership and control conflicts are discussed here; the benefit distribu-
tionconflictsareexaminedlaterintheresource allocationrole discussion.
Acquisition ofequity capital and overall evaluation ofthe cooperative's
performancearethetwomajorsourcesofnon-legaPcooperativeownership
rights and responsibilities conflicts. Cooperative management should be
aware that, at the root ofthese potential conflicts, are the free-rider and
horizonproblems. Thefree-rider problem, as itrelates to the equityacqui-
sition challenge, can be described as the possible tendency by members
to under-investintheirorganizationbecausecapitalinvestmentsincoop-
erativesearnlimitedorzero returns.4The horizonproblememanatesfrom
the illiquidity and nonappreciation in value of cooperative stock. Since
future earnings cannot be captured by cooperative stockholders, there is
a tendency to pressure cooperative leadership (management and board)
to maximize short-term benefits to members even though such a policy
maybedetrimentalfrom thelong-runperspective.Whatdeterminesshort-
term benefits at the expense of long-term benefits depends on whether
a member is under- or over-invested from a proportional equity capital
contributionpointofview. Italso depends onwhether a memberis classi-
fied as active (current) or inactive.
Historicallythere has notbeenan "explicitamount" principleregarding
equitycapital contributionotherthan "eqUityis provided bypatrons"and
"eqUityownershipshareofindividualpatronsislimited" (Barton 1989, 27).
ButastheRochdale principlesevolved intothecontemporaryprinciplesof
user-owned, controlled, andbenefitted, thepractice ofprovidingcapitalin
proportion to patronagehas achievedincreasinginterestand acceptance.
Some cooperatives have addressed these inherent, free-rider horizon,
problem-rooted conflicts by tying patronage rights in the cooperative to
the provision ofequity capital.548 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
A second major potential user-ownership conflict surfaces dUring the
evaluation ofthe cooperative's performance. For a manager accustomed
to simplereturn-on-assets (ROA) orreturn-on-investment (ROI) measure-
mentsofIOFperformance, evaluatingwhetherone'scooperativeis achiev-
ing its objective(s) is far more complex. Staatz (1987) hypothesizes that
the scope of optimization in a cooperative is broader and more diffuse
than it is for a comparable IOF. He argues that most members prefer a
jointprofitoptimization (a combinedfarm and cooperative objective func-
tion rather than optimization ofseparate profit functions). The scope of
optimizationis also more diffuse because the cooperative musttreateach
memberas a separate cost locus giving rise to collective choice problems.
Fora cooperativemanager, thisbroader, more diffuse objectivefunction
contributestoa morecomplexdecisionmatrix.Thiscomplexityinmeasur-
ing cooperative performance often leads to vagueness and lack ofclarity
intheeyesofthemember.Thismemberconfusionoftenleadsthemanager
toquery: Whoisthemember?Whatisgoodperformance?Theseareimpor-
tant but complex questions. Good performance for the inactive or over-
invested member is measured bythe amount ofthe member's equitythat
isreturned, but good performancefor the under-invested or newmember
ismeasuredbythecompetitivenessofcurrentpricesorservices. Forother
members, separateorjointprofitmaximizationmight bethe main criteria
for evaluating performance. One manager's objective function might be
anincreaseinmarketshareorrevenuegrowth,whereasthewiseold-timer,
from the competitive yardstick school, might think the key to cooperative
success is: Did the cooperative keep the IOFs honest? Consequently, we
are faced with a plethora ofobjectives, enough to make the identification
of the cooperative's objective function one of the cooperative manager's
most challenging tasks (a lesson never learned at school, perhaps one
never even known to the school master).
The bottom line is this: The user-owner uniqueness of cooperatives
forces a cooperative manager interested in minimizing conflicts between
members to take a more integrated view ofthe fixed costs ofthe coopera-
tive's owner-userwhen attempting to optimize the vaguely defined objec-
tive function ofthe association. It also encourages cooperative managers
to bemore interdependent and interactivewith user-owners in executing
interpersonal and leadership roles. Consequently, conflict resolution for
the cooperative manager probably means peace-keeping sojourns to the
country more frequently than his/her IOF counterpart.
The cooperative manager faces another set of potential conflicts,
althoughmoresubtle,whenconfrontingtheuniquecooperativecharacter-
istic called "user-control." Conflicts arise when the distribution ofequity
capital ownership is held by a small group of active patrons and voting
powerisinthehandsofa broadrangeofinactive, smallerpatrons.Because
ofthe amount ofcapital they might have invested, large patrons are more
reluctant to exit a cooperative. This leads to "voice" pressure on manage-
ment in the terms of Hirschman (1970). This pressure, exerted through
informal channels, might conflict with signals communicated by the
numerical majoritythrough more formal channels. The diffusion ofpoliti-
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possibility that a majority ofmembers who may contribute only a small
part of the patronage and capital may approve policies that exploit the
minority oflarger patrons who own the non-revenue-bearing capital.
Another conflict emanating from this unique control characteristic is in
determiningthe cooperative'sperformanceobjectives. Ifinactivemembers
are enfranchised (manycooperatives do notdisenfranchiseinactive mem-
bers),thehorizonproblemmighthavea considerableeffectontheselection
ofboard members and their subsequent preferences as to residual claim
distribution.
Conflicts generated by control issues are the most delicate and difficult
to address for a cooperativemanager. Theyalso involve considerable risk.
Yet, without political (governance) stability, managing a cooperative
becomes extremely difficult and stressful.
Negotiator Role Differences. Negotiation among cooperative stake-
holderswas coveredinthe conflictresolutiondiscussion. Therole ofnego-
tiationonbehaljofthecooperatives'stakeholdersisbrieflydiscussedhere.
One ofthe constants in negotiating on behalfofa cooperative is that the
group ofuser-owners has already demonstrated willingness to vertically
integrate. Combining cooperative members' legal protection under the
Capper-Volstead Act, a track record of previous horizontal and vertical
integration, and the "assurance leverage" ofability to supply orbuy gives
a negotiator a strong startingpositionwhen dealingwith potentialbuyers
or suppliers.
The challenges of negotiating for a cooperative, of course, depend on
the situation, but at least three areas of caution must be considered by
the cooperative manager:
1. The more heterogeneous the membership, the higher will be the
transactioncostsinformingconsensusandviableinternalcoalitions;
2. The more sub-coalitions that need to be formed, the more log-rolling
(tyingthe negotiationofoneissue to another)thatneedstotakeplace
(thisresultsinhighernegotiationcostsplusdecreasestheprobability
offinding the optimal resource exchange solution); and
3. Both the strategic and tactical aspects of negotiation demand the
need to possess and the ability to use asymmetric information.
Becauseoftheuser-ownershipandcontroluniquenessofcooperative
organizationsand the consequenteconomic effectonusers ofnegoti-
ation results, possession and use ofasymmetric information places
an added challenge on the cooperative manager-negotiator.
ResourceAllocationDifferences.Themanagerial role ofresource allo-
cation is the heart ofthe organization's strategy-making system. The key
resourcessubjecttoallocationare: humancapital; time; reputation; plant,
material, and equipment; and money. According to Mintzberg (1971),
resource allocation comprises three essential elements: (1) allocatingand
schedulingtime, (2) programmingwork, and (3) authorizingactions. Here,
allocating time and authorizing actions will receive the most attention
sinceprogrammingworkwasaddressedinthediscussionontheentrepre-
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The cooperative manager's allocation oftime plays a critical role in the
successoftheagricultural cooperative. As previouslynoted, conflictman-
agement takes precedence over all other managerial roles. It was argued
that cooperatives have a higher potential for conflict among stakeholders
than IOFsbecauseoftheuniquewaycooperativesresolve residualclaims,
propertyrights,andcontrolissues.Therefore, a cooperativemanagermust
allocate more of his/her time to conflict resolution. This disturbance-
handling portion of member relations (member relations is discussed in
greater depth in the informational section) must be managed very effec-
tively. Both collective choice option identification and coalition building
consumeconsiderableblocks oftimeand replace timethat couldbespent
on other decisional roles.
The authorizing action aspect ofa cooperative manager's resource allo-
cation process is affected by three important factors: (1) the need to have
a more integrated view ofthe boundaries ofthe cooperative firm, (2) the
norms ofdistributingand acquiringinternallygenerated risk capital, and
(3) the user-owner attitude toward risk.
The resource allocation decision in a cooperative takes place in a more
vaguely defined boundary than does the resource allocation decision in
an IOF. In other words, a cooperative manager will be expected to have
a more integrated view of his/her suppliers' or customers' (members')
operationthanwillan IOFmanager. Why?Thereare a numberofreasons.
1. Cooperative user-owners behaveas usersofthe organization's goods
and services on an almost daily basis. Cooperative user-owners (if
current and active) behave as owner-investors only several times a
year (tax day, equity redemption day, dividend day). This frequent-
use interface relativeto investorinterfacebythe cooperativemember
affects the resource-allocation decision making by voicing and rein-
forcing a constantmessagethatpriceandqualityofthecooperative's
services and goods affect the member-owner's bottom line, which is
more important (in the short run and for the individual member)
than the bottom line ofthe cooperative.
2. For Sapiro II and the marketing function of Nourse I and Nourse
II cooperatives, open membership has the economic implication of
providing a home for all of the members' product. In essence the
cooperativeistakingintoaccounttheneedtoamortizetheirmembers'
fixed-farm investments (Staatz 1987). To the IOF, these fixed costs
are transformedviathe marketintovariable costs. Theseintegrated,
fixed-variable cost views, from the cooperative vantage point, have
complexand potential conflict-creating, physical capacity allocation
implications.
3. Because the decisions made at the cooperative level have an effect
on the value ofthe member's fixed assets and working capital, the
memberwill have a tendencyto inspectresource allocation decisions
on an individual basis.
The cooperative principle of developed norms ofdistributing internally
generated risk capital also has important implications for the resource
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1. Cooperativemembersareinterestedintheincomedistributionconse-
quences of their association's marketing and cost allocation deci-
sions. Usuallythebenefitofthecooperativetotheindividualmember-
user depends more on the prices of goods and services purchased
from thecooperative orthecostdeductedfrom productssoldthanon
the cooperative's profitability, so pricing and cost allocation policies
mighthavesignificantshort-runcashflow effectsontheperformance
ofthe member's firm. But they also have significant working capital
and profitability implications for the cooperative. Because of this
interconnectedness, the price-policy decision-making process6
(1) might be more costly (need to develop pricing-policy consensus),
(2) mightconstraincross-subsidizingtactics for marketsharestrate-
gies, and (3) might inhibit cross-subsidization needed to enter new
product fields.
2. Pricingpolicyaffectsdistributionofincometothecooperativepatrons
by affecting their tax liability and cash flow (see Peterson 1992 for
detailed discussion) resulting in conflicts betweenhigh marginal tax
bracketmembers and cash-flow-deficient, lowtaxbracketmembers.
3. Many cooperative managers and writers have argued that the most
difficult challenge in contemporary cooperative management is
acquiring equity capital. Staatz (1987) condenses theirarguments to
thefollowing. Membersarereluctanttocontributemoreequitycapital
to the cooperative because (1) the return on investment at the farm
level is greater than return on investment in the cooperative; (2)
for free-rider reasons or because ofheavy discounting of patronage
refunds, the member underestimates the value of the cooperative;
and (3) the member overvalues return on investment on the farm.
Additionally, geographic and commodity scope may limit number of
members and consequently the amount of capital that could be
raised. As mentioned earlier, these arguments have been contested
bynumerous studies summarized inLermanand Parliament (1993).
Whether cooperatives are under-financed or not, the process in
acquiring equity capital is considerably different from raising equity
inanIOF. Thereisnoentrepreneurialincentiveunless deliveryrights
accompany membership entry, and there is no capital market inter-
ested in providingcapitalbecause ofthe illiquidityand nonapprecia-
bility characteristics ofcooperative stock. Therefore. the cooperative
decision maker in his/her resource allocator role must treat equity
withextremecare.This difficultyinacquiringequityandtheinherent
conflicts created by the horizon problem have been blamed for the
scarcity of cooperative investment in capital-intensive industries.
4. Other differences between the equity acquisition and redemption
methodsofIOFsandcooperativeshaveeffectsontheresourcealloca-
tion role ofmanagement. In attempting to address the horizon prob-
lem. cooperative managers qUickly encounter the fact that ifequity
is to be retired, new equitycapitalmustbe acqUiredjusttomaintain
the same capital structure and level ofworking capital. Ifgrowth is
an objective, the equity that is retired plus the incremental needed
forgrowthmustbeadded. Giventhelimitedsourcesofequitycapital.52 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
itiseasytounderstandwhythosewhofavorgrowthbecomeattracted
to the development ofpermanentequityreserves. Another difference
in resource allocation might arise in the process of developing the
capital expenditure budget. Where the board is elected on a one-
person, one-vote basis in many cases, small-in-number but large-
in-patronage members might face difficult hurdles in attempting to
move the cooperative in a new or more current customerjsupplier-
oriented direction. Cooperative management-usually a proponent
ofgrowth for numerous agentand non-agentreasons-must referee
this potential conflict objectively.
Because ofsite asset specificity (especiallyin Nourse I, II, Sapiro II, and
New Generation cooperatives), cooperative members tend to pursue risk-
conservativestrategieswhendealingwithdiversification. Thisriskaverse-
ness is reinforced by the fact that an investment in a cooperative is an
investment in a related industry, thus decreasing diversification. These
two factors could influence cooperative management to concentrate the
allocation ofresources less on portfolio or boundary assets and more on
improving operating efficiencies.
Informational Role Differences
In the information role ofmonitor, disseminator, and spokesperson for
an organization, the manager performs a "nerve center" function. In the
monitor role, the manager becomes informed about the organization and
itsenvironment, andinthedisseminatorandspokespersonroles, selected
informationis transmitted to differentsetsofstakeholders. As inthe deci-
sional role, the unique characteristics ofa cooperative modifY the manag-
er's behavior in performing the informational role.
Monitoring Role Differences. As monitor, the manager seeks and
receives information that enables him/her to detect changes, opportuni-
ties, andproblems.Accordingto Mintzberg(1971) theinformationreceived
falls into five categories: (1) internal operation, (2) external events, (3)
analyses, (4) ideas, and (5) pressures.
Because the owneris the userin a cooperative, the member-userwould
have different preferences as to price, cost allocation, and equity retire-
ment policies. These policies affect the members as well as the coopera-
tive's cash flow and financial structure. Consequently, setting these poli-
cies in a cooperative is a complex and delicate undertaking-far more so
than in an IOF.? Therefore, the cooperative manager, who is ultimately
involved in the formulation and implementation of these policies, must
actively seek information useful in discovering the optimal choice.
Since cooperative members, especiallythosewith large equityholdings,
have a disincentive to exit, "voice" isanimportantinstrumentin express-
ing concern to the decision makers. The ability to monitor and screen
"substantivevoice" from "noisevoice" isanimportantskill for cooperative
managers. Notdevelopingthisabilityleadstoa policyof"pleasingeveryone
all ofthe time" in the short run. In the long run, the economic integrity
ofthe organization can bejeopardized by pursuing non-decisive, "please
all" collective choice policies. Consequently, critical monitoring of"voice"Management ofCooperatives/Cook 53
is important to the conflict resolution and resource allocation decision
roles ofa cooperative manager.
Another monitoring difference between IOFs and cooperatives involves
the evaluation ofthe organization's performance. Because ofthe broader,
more diffuse scope ofoptimizationin a cooperative, singleindicatorssuch
as ROA are less meaningful as measures of organizational performance.
Additionally, there areno objectivethird-partyindicatorssuchas second-
arymarketsfor cooperative-issuedstocktoassistshareholdersinthetask
of evaluating performance. Cooperative management is, therefore, faced
with developing an information network more complex than the perfor-
mance monitoring systems employed by IOFs.
The cooperative manager has an advantage in monitoring information
sources for problems, opportunities, and pressure. Cooperatives' share-
holdersaretheusers, anditisprobablethata userwouldbemorewillingto
provide higherquality, morefrequent, andgreateramountsofinformation
than would a customer or supplier ofan IOF where "exit" might be a less
expensive option than "voice." Because of the more complex accounting
system needed to track each member's transactions (Remember: equity
is sourced and benefits distributed according to patronage), cooperatives
have a list ofevery patron and, in some cases, detailed information about
each member-patron. Cooperative members also have more channels to
access the formal governance structure than in an IOF, although they
might be more indirect.
Disseminating Role Differences. Perhaps the most challenging day-
to-day decision confrontingcooperativemanagementis determiningwhat
informationshouldbedisseminatedand towhom. The dissemination role
answersthis questionas towho internallyreceiveswhat information. The
difference between this managerial role in an IOF and a cooperative is
in the need to prepare a cooperative's employees to understand basic
cooperative characteristics. If the employees understand the behavioral
implications ofvaguely defined propertyrights, user control, and benefits
tied to patronage, their attitudes-and perhaps actions-will be more
empathetic toward the owners and users of this unique, user-oriented
type ofbusiness organization. Cooperative basic training for employees is
becominglesscommon(USDA-ACS 1993), makingthecooperativegeneral
manager's role ofdisseminating more challenging.
Spokesperson Role Differences. In this role, the manager transmits
information to two major groups: (1) the set of key opinion makers and
influencers-in a cooperativethis includesnot onlythe board ofdirectors
but also the members, and (2) the organization's public-suppliers, gov-
ernment agencies, trade organizations, the press, and customers (for
Sapiro I and II, and New Generation cooperatives).
Cooperative boards and members as user-owners of a tied-eqUity type
of organization have high expectations as to how much operating and




erative are some arguments offered by members as justification for their
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Management, on the otherhand, takes the position that the more com-
petitive the environment, the more valuable undistributed strategic infor-
mation becomes. They add that cooperatives invest heavily in member
communication, media, and networks, and their innovative communica-
tion methods should receive more respect and appreciation. To do more,
theymightargue,istoocostly. Increasingheterogeneityofthemembership
increases the complexity offulfilling this critical role, and it is probably a
given that managers ofuser-oriented organizations will never be relieved
ofthepressuregeneratedbycontinualdemand forstrategicandoperation
information. As the spokesperson for a user-oriented firm, a critical chal-
lengeistobuilda cooperativeknowledgebasewithinthemembership.The
spokesperson's role should include helping user-members understand:
1. Cooperative benefits are derived from patronage, not investment;
2. Loyalty can be economically rational (Loyalty is rational to Member
X ifthe short-run performance ofthe cooperative can be improved if
MemberXpatronizesthecooperative-assuminga downwardsloping
costcurveforprocessingorhandling-andifthelong-rundiscounted
net benefits from Member X patronizing the cooperative are greater
than the alternatives.);
3. The basics ofmarket failure and the competitive yardstick concept;
and
4. The scope ofoptimizationfor a cooperative is broader, more complex,
and more diffuse than it is for an IOF.
U the spokesperson is successful in raising the basic-differences level of
user-oriented organizations, fewer resources will be dedicated to log-roll-
ing and coalition-building projects.
Interpersonal Role Differences
The interpersonal roles of figurehead, liaison, and leader are derived
from the formal authority and status ofthe general manager's position.
How well a manager performs in these roles influences the quality of
information he/she isable to acquire, whichinturn affects the manager's
ability to perform well in executing decisional roles. These interpersonal
roles are important in managing cooperatives.
Figurehead Role Differences. The manager performs the figurehead
role because it is (1) required by law, (2) a social necessity, or (3) because
itisa businessnecessity (i.e., someonewantstointerfacewiththe "person
at the top").
Signingdocumentsandperformingthelegalactionsina cooperativeand
an IOF appear to be quite similar. Fulfilling the social role offigurehead,
especiallyatthechiefexecutiveofficerlevel, is quitedemandingbut, again,
is probablynotmuch different in comparable cooperatives and IOFs. Per-
forming the figurehead role for stakeholders who demand to be seen by
and/or to see the person at the top can be different in a cooperative
where members as users want the person at the top to be empathetic
and knowledgeable about the symbiotic and interdependent relationship
betweenthecooperativeandthemember'sfarmfirm. Therefore, theperson
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in the business but also in the technical aspects of the finn's services
and products.
Liaison Role Differences. In the liaison role, as defined by Mintzberg
(1971). the manager deals with horizontal external relationships that are
leveragedintopositiveexchangerelationships.Themanagementliterature
and this author have little to offer to help us understand how this role
might be different in a cooperative and an IOF.
Leadership Role Differences. User-members know that the real test
of cooperative leadership lies not in personality or behavior, but in the
coordinated perfonnanceofthe cooperativeand fann entity. The manage-
ment leadership literature (Bass, Avolio, and Goodheim 1987) suggests
thatwhengroupsarefree to do so theyselectasleaders peoplewho create
the expectation that they will be able to maintain goal direction, facilitate
task achievement, and ensure group cohesiveness.
Fulfillingthedemandsofthesethreeelementsofleadershipisa challeng-
ingtask to a manager employed by a cooperative-perhaps more difficult




ment.Accomplishingthesetasksina cooperative, however, iscomplicated
bythe democraticallyorienteduserprinciple.Thechallengeto cooperative
leadershipistoreduceincreasinglyheterogeneousintereststomorehomo-
geneous interests in order to capture the benefits ofcoordination (Staatz
1983). Integrating individual needs with organizational goals is complex
in any business organization, but when the user-investor conflict (epito-
mized by horizon and free-rider problems) is combined with a principal-
agentconflict(representedbytheadditionofmemberstothemanagement-
employeerelationship) thechallengeofaccomplishinggroupcohesiveness
and taskachievement is indeedmonumental. Themagnitude ofthis chal-
lenge is a function ofnumerous factors, but is probably most affected by
theleadership abilitiesofthe cooperative'sboardofdirectors. Nothingcan
improve the probability of meeting this challenge more than a strong,
cooperative-knowledgeable, articulate board ofdirectors.
Summary and Conclusions
Theobjectiveofthisarticleisto explorethe degree ofdifficultyinmanag-
ing a user-oriented finn relative to an investor-oriented finn. It is argued
that organizational differences between user-oriented (Agricultural coop-
eratives are the example used.) and IOFs affect management behaviorby
influencingmanagerialworkingroles. Modifications ofmanagerialbehav-
ior ofuser-owned, user-controlled, user-benefited principles and charac-
teristics are evaluated using Mintzberg's (1971) managerial working role
model.
The results ofthis non-empirical essay suggest that the user-oriented
characteristics do modify IOF-benchmarked management behavior. In
some roles, particularly the conflict resolution, resource allocation, infor-
mation spokesperson, and leadership roles, the behavioral consequences56 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
are significantly different. It is argued that, in some cases, performing
these managerial roles in a cooperative is more difficult.
Ifthe findings in this essay have any merit, one might conclude a suc-
cessful manager of a user-oriented firm needs not only the skills of an
IOF business leader but at least four additional qualifications.
1. Becauseofthebroadnessanddiffuseness ofthecooperativeobjective
function, the potentialtop managermustbe comfortablewithvague-
ness, complexity, and conflict. Operational and financial measure-
ments are often interrelated with trust in the evaluation of user-
oriented management.
2. Cooperative management, because ofthe more limited source of
equity capital and its user-orientedness, must concentrate more
planningeffortsondevelopingentrepreneurialandoperatingabilities
rather than on portfolio-related objectives. This places a premium
on the technical-operations, people-oriented resource allocation
manager rather than on the financial-portfolio, diversification-ori-
ented manager.
3. Authentically delivered communications, combinedwith an appreci-
ation of the unique characteristics of cooperatives, are imperative.
Understanding the potential investor-versus-user stakeholder con-
flicts is essential to becoming a professional spokesperson for mem-
bers and the user-oriented firms' public audiences.
4. All boards ofdirectors lookfor leadership skills in candidates for top
management. The breadth of scope in goals makes defining task
achievement more difficult in a cooperative than an IOF. Therefore,
the cooperative manager must be not only strategically conceptual,
but also skilled in defining measurable sub-goals. In addition, the
cooperativeleadermustbecomfortablewithbuildingcoalitions, con-




on Phillips' Economic Nature ofthe CooperativeAssociation" inthis issue
ofthe Journal ojAgricultural Cooperatives.
2. For this paper, the use of"manager" means the person reporting to
a board ofdirectors. In most cooperatives this position carries the title of
general manager or chiefexecutive officer.
3. For a discussion of potential ownership conflicts regarding stock
versus nonstock incorporation, see Suhler and Cook (1993).
4. Whether members under-invest in their cooperative organizations is
an empirical question. For a recent review of the literature addressing
cooperativecapitalunder-investment, see Lermanand Parliament (1993).
5. All New Generation cooperatives (Cook 1993) are financed on a pro-
portional to patronage principle. Also see Royer (1992) for a deSCription
ofsome ofthe unique methods beingemployed to address these conflicts.
6. Pricing policy could be considered a key element in the development
ofequity acquisition programs.Management ofCooperatives/ Cook 57
7. The complexityofaddressing the collective choice problem is a func-
tionofnumerousfactors-especiallytheheterogeneityofthemembership.
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